Volume 2
Issue 1 The Forum - Volume 2, Issue 1
1-1898

The Forum - Volume 2, Issue 3

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/forum

Recommended Citation
The Forum - Volume 2, Issue 3, 2 DICK. L. REV. 45 (2020).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/forum/vol2/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in The Forum by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more information, please
contact lja10@psu.edu.

THE FORUM.
Vol. 11.

JANUARY, 1898.

No. 3

Published Monthly by the Students of

THE DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW,
CARLISLE, PA.

CLAUDE L. ROTH.
FRANK B. SELLERS, Jr.

EDITORS.
G. FRANC WETZEL.
WALTER G. TREIBLY.
HERMAN M. SYPHERD.

BUSINESS MANAGERS.
ALBERT T. MORGAN.

PHILIP E. RADLE.
GABRIEL H. MOVER.

MEREIEL LANDIS.
CHARLES G. MOYER.
Subscription, $1.25 per Annum.
Address all Communications to
THE FORUM, CARLISLE, PA.

EDITORIAL.
ABOUT BRIEFS.
The maker of a brief must bear in mind
that the court, for whom he intends it, is
not altogether imbecile. He does not need
to write a formal argument. He does
enough when he states, briefly but lucidly,
what he regards as the governing principles. We say, briefly and lucidly. One
of these qualities is almost as important as
the other. The court can not take kindly
to a prolix statement, however clear, and
a statement admirable for brevity, if wanting in perspicuity, is a delusion. Terseness, clearness, these are the greatest
virtues of style that the advocate can exhibit before the court.
But a well stated principle should not be
left to commend itself to the credence of
the court without authority. It is sometimes of interest to a judge to know what
a lawyer thinks about a certain legal
proposition; but there is a natural. doubt
of the correspondence of the opinion expressed by the attorney for a litigant, with
that which he really entertains. Besides
the judge would much rather know what
some court of authority has said on the
subject. Every proposition of law should
be sustained, when possible, by adjudications. The names of the parties in a case
as well as the volume and page where it is
reported should be given. It is a sign of
the indolent lawyer, that he contents
himself with designating the volume and

page alone. Nor should it be assumed
that all cases involving a principle are
equally worthy of citation. In some the
principle is only obliquely alluded to. These
are not as authoritative as those in which
it is consciously and deliberately stated,
and adopted as the ratio decidendi. The
opinions of the courts vary in value, according to the ability of their writers, or
the care with which they have been composed. The decision of a higher court is to
be preferred, other things being equal,
to that of a lower; a more modern to an
older. When many cases are cited, the
more cogent, and direct, should be distinguished from the other. The court has
other work to do, than to determine any
one particular cause. It may lack opportunity, or inclination to read many decisions, when one or two well selected ones
would abundantly convince it. Ifit should
happen that the first one or two cases read
by it seemed indecisive, irrelevant, or adverse, it would suspect the judgment or
the diligence of counsel, and possibly to
him and his cause less than justice. It
sometimes happens that the precise principle desiderated is not found in any decision; but that principles more or less similar may be. It is then often necessary to
compare several cases together, and the
citation of a greater number of cases is not
only pardonable but advisable.
It is needless to add, that the brief
ought to be composed in the English
language, and ought to be fairly decipherable. Most lawyers, who do not command
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a typewriter, are capable, when they try,
of producing tolerably legible characters
with the pen. An illegible brief is often
worse than none, for, besides failing to enlighten the judge, it exasperates him
through the fruitless efforts he has made
to translate it.
Students who are to graduate in June
1898, are now commencing to work on
their theses. These theses cover 50 pages
of legal cap. The topics are selected by
the writers, subject to the approval of the
dean. It is expected that the cases will
be studied, and the doctrines therein found,
constructed into a systematic treatise.
Long quotations are ta be avoided. These
theses can not be made to serve a double
purpose. They will win no prize. Prize
essays art additional.
A supplementary volume on the Law of
Boroughs in Pennsylvania, by Dean
Trickett, is now going through the press.
It will contain the results of the adjudications during the four years that have followed the publication of the first volume.
THE LAW OF DIVORCE.
On the invitation of the Faculty of the
School of Law, Win. Hardenstle Browne,
A. M., of the Philadelphia Bar, delivered
a lecture upon the above subject to a large
and attentive audience in the Court House
on Friday evening, December 10th. He
was introduced in a complimentary speech
by Judge Biddle. Mr. Browne illustrated
the leading divisions of his theme by a
description of several, reported cases, with
a narration of facts. He has written and
published two books on the subject upon
which he lectured. One was a Digest of
all reported cases on the theme of Divorce,
found in the printed decisions of the appellate courts of the United States. At a
much later date, he wrote a Commentary
on the Law of Divorce and Alimony.
Mr. Browne has also written a large
Digest of Decisions on the Law of Negligence in Pennsylvania, followed the present year by a two volume edition of the
Law of Decedents' Estates in this Commonwealth. He has edited abridged editions of both Blackstone's and Kent's
Commentaries, copies of all which works
he has presented to our library.

In addition to these legal works, he is
the author and compiler of numerous literary volumes.
The following is an extract of a letter received from the Collector Publishing Co.
by one of the students of the Dickinson
School of Law.
'We are very glad to receive such communication from the Dickinson Law
School, which we judge from observation
of the various law schools of the country
and notes that we have received from them
is unquestionably one of the best law
schools of the country, and is giving its
students as good a preparation for their
after work as they could hope to obtain in
any other school, and better than nine out
often. In fact, the system and work of your
school, as described to us by yourself and
other students, commands our admiration,
and must command the admiration of
every legal educator. We shall be glad to
hear from you as often as your convenience
will permit."
The January Law Student's Helper contains a report of one of the Dickinson
moot court cases, as given in the Law
School FoRUm.
It is with' pleasure that the FORUm notes
the January number of the Law Student's
Helper. The Helper in its January numher reports the case of James Buchanan v.
Shamokin Ry., remarking on the thorough
way in which the Moot Court work is
carried on at our school.
The FoRmur while thanking the Law
Student's Helper for the recognition given
it, also wishes to state that many complimentary remarks from other sources are
being made about the FORUm and the work
done at the Dickinson School of Law.
THE LIBRARY.
It is just three years ago that the Library received its largest donation, the
sum of $1,000 presented as a New Year's
gift by Mrs. Mary Cooper Allison of Philadelphia. When the school opened, in
October 1890, it had not a single book.
During the year, the Dean put in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reports beginning with Barr. Certain incorporators
made contributions by which digests and
4 few text books were procured. From
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publishers others were obtained. In 1891,
a Japanese bazaar was held by Mr. Issa
Tanimura, of Tokio, then in the school,
from which $400 was realized. The funds
of the school have been in part employed
in securing additions. In this way the
library has grown until it is now a larger
and more useful collection of books than
nine lawyer.3 out of every ten in the state
of Pennsylvania have regular access to.
The gift of Mrs. Allison was the means of
placing at the disposal ofithe studebits the
reports of New York, of the Circuit Court
of Appeals, and of the Supreme Court of
the United States, and the English reports; the most important single addition
yet made to the school library. It is proper
to recall that the re-opening of the law
school was projected in 1890 by four gentlemen, Dr. Reed, President of the college,
William C. Allison, Esq., husband of the
benefactress to whom we have referred,
Hon. W. F. Sadler, and Dean Trickett. It
was made possible by the generous offer
of Mr. Allison to fit up the building, then
in a very dilapidated state, for law school
uses. While he lived the school had no
more solicitous and generous patron; the
names of this estimable gentleman and of
Mrs. Allison, who survives him, will forever be remembered by those who from
time to time, come to the school and gain
their professional preparation within its
walls. In the name of the students we
send respectful and cordial New Year's
greetings to Mrs. Allison.

ALUMNI PERSONALS.
Thomas K. Leidy, '97, has been admitted to practice at the Berks County Bar.
On January the 3rd, an editor of the
FOR=f had the pleasure of paying a visit
to 3. Banks Kurtz, 193, in his comfortable
and well situated offices in Altoona. ir.
Kurtz is one of the most successful young
attorneys in that busy city and reflects
much credit upon his Alma fater.
D. D. Lewis, a former member of the
class of 199, has left school and intends to
start in a short time for the Alaskan gold
fields,

D. L. Fickes, 195, spent a few days in
Carlisle during the holidays.
Rush Trescott, '95, is Assistant District
Attorney in Luzerne county.
The marriage of Wm. D. Boyer, '92, to
Mrs. Louise Alton Hosie, of Brooklyn, has
been announced.
Harry F. Kantner, '97, has been made
Deputy Prothonotary of Berks county.
Charles C. Greer, '93, who is practicing
very successfully in Johnstown, has lately
made quite an addition to his library. An
editor of the FoRnmr found him most
pleasantly located.
Samuel C. Boyer, '93, shows by a letter,
recently received from him, that he has
not losthis interest in the school.
Homer Shoemaker, '92, was married
last month.
Joshua W. Swartz, 192, has been made
secretary of a Harrisburg Building and
Loan Association.
John Small, '97, who recently passed
his examinations in Northampton county
is practicing in Shamokin.
G. W. Betson, Jr., of Greenboro, Md.,
entered the middle class on the opening of
the Winter Term.
J. G. Davis, of Baltimore, Md., entered
the Junior class at the opening of the
Winter Term.
W. Harrison Walker, 196, is fastadvancing to the front in the community where
he is practicing his profession. He has
lately associated with David F. Fortney,
Esq., one of the leaders in the Centre Co.
Bar. The following from the Millheim
Journal has come to our notice:
"W. Harrison Walker, Esq., the hustling junior partner of the law firm of
Fortney & Walker, of Bellefonte, was in
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town on Friday, the 14th inst., attending
to legal business of a very important nature to some of our citizens of this end of
the county. Mr. Walker is one of the
most promising young attorneys at the
Centre County Bar, and we are always
glad to welcome him in our community."
GLEE CLUB AND ORCHESTRA TRIP.
The Dickinson Glee Club and Orchestra during the holidays, took a most successful trip through a portion of Pennsylvania including the towns of Millersburg,
Wiconisco, Mt. Carmel, Shamokin, Sunbury, Williamsport. Altoona, Johnstown
and Martinsburg. All long the route the
boys were most enthusiastically welcomed,
and their concerts received comments
which are of no little credit to the club.
What added greatly to the pleasures of
the trip was the splendid entertainment
which the club received at several of the
towns, by students and Alumni of the
Law School. At Wiconisco, Messrs. Miller
and Coles of the Middle Class were on
hand to greet the boys. At Shamokin
half of the Junior class warmly welcomed
them and was instrumental in having a
dance tendered to them. Rufus Lincoln,
'96, who is practicing at Shamokin, also
aided-in their entertainment.
Messrs. John, Shoener and Strauss met
the club at Mt. Carmel and gave the boys
a hearty reception. During their stay in
that pleasant mining town, they acquired
a more appreciative idea of real estate, by
beingshown the masses in the coal, coal,
ground; an experience which, once tried,
makes a sufficiently lasting impression.
The miners enjoyed immensely asong from
the boys four hundred feet under ground.
The club gave a concert at Altoona upon
the solicitation of J. Banks Kurtz of the
class of '93 and at Johnstown the boys
were warmly welcomed by Chas. C. Greer,
of that same illustrious class, who was the
means of having a reception tendered to
them after the concert in the Y. M. C. A.
Hall. The trip throughout was eminently
successful and the efficient manager of the
organization, C. N. Berntheisel, '98, is now
arranging a southern trip at Easter.
J. F. Santee, '96, has been appointed
Deputy Prothonotary of Luzerne County.

THE SCHOOL.
The second term of the school year 1897'98 opened on Wednesday, January 12th,
with a large attendance of the students,
ready to enter upon the work of the long
term which ends June 6th, the faculty
not deeming it wise that the attention of
the students be distracted from their work
by a short Easter vacation.
The FORurM extends the sympathies of
the school to Mr. W. Flannigan of the
Junior class who was summoned home on
the morning of the 21st of January because
of the serious illness of his mother. The
FORUMr hopes for the early return of Mr.
Flannigan and the speedy recovery of his
mother.
The FORUM is pleased to report the convalescence ofMr. John G. Miller of the Junior class. Mr. Miller was unable to join his
class at the opening of the Winter Term,
because of typhoid fever. He expects to
return to school about thefirst of February.
Geo. L. Schuyler, of Milton, Pa., entered
the Junior class at the opening of the
term.
G. Frank Wetzel made a pleasant call
on William Hardcastle Browne, Esq., of
Philadelphia, who rendered himself so
popular with the students by his able lecture on Divorce delivered last term.
Mr. Browne who is one of the most eminent authorities on divorce in this country
contemplates presenting the school with a
complete set of his works, including works
on Negligence, Decedents' Estates, Abridgments of Blackstone's and Kent's Commentaries and Divorce. He is now engaged in interpolating the last named
work with the very latest cases decided
upon the subject and upon the completion
of which he expects to make the presentation to the school.
The students of the law school appreciate very much the kindness of this erudite and distinguished gentleman.
The photograph of the Junior class
which is to adorn the pages of the .Microcosm was taken a few weeks ago by
photographer Line.

THE FORUM.
Messrs. Moyer, Berntheisel, and Shalters
have been appointed as the Executive
Committee of the Senior Class.
Changes are being made in our curriculum from time to time in consequence of
chhnge to the three year course. During
this term the Juniors study Bailments
and Carriers instead of Private Corporations as heretofore.
Special attention is being given by our
students to the study of Bldckstone, as itimportance becomes more thoroughly impressed upon them by almost every lawyer with whom they come in contact.
We might speak of this as a Blackstonian
revival.
The Middle class has taken up the sub'Ject of Evidence under Dean Trickett, and
Equity with Hon. J. M. Weakley as instructor.
Harvey Knupp, '97, of Harrisburg, has
returned to take a post-graduate course.
A. Frank John, '99, and Marlin Wolf,
'99, were the center of attraction Tuesday
evening, January 18th, at Irving College,
Mechanicsburg.
THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
On the opening evehing of the new term,
January 12th, the Dickinson Society
united with the Allison Society to listen
to a lecture deliver-

ed by J. W. Wetzel, Esq., than
whom there is not
a more able lawyer
at the Cumberland
County 2Bar. Mr.
Wetzel, who was
introduced by Mr.
Charles E. Daniels,
... .ZEL,
.
haPresident of the Allison Society, pleas3. W. WETZEL, ESQ.
antly welcomed the
students back to Carlisle, and the Law
School. Then he gave a very interesting
lecture on "Jury -Trials.'
Mr. Wetzel
first told of the importance of knowing
the jurisdiction of cases.
Then he proceeded, step by step, in an explanation

of the proper conduct of a case. He told
of the care necessary in selecting a jury,
the manner of conveying salient points of
fact and of law to the jurors, the treatment
of witnesses, and the method of procuring evidence, and other essentials of a trial.
The lecture was an unusually instructive
one because Mr. Wetzel made every point
so plain and practical, giving experiences
students do not find in books, but which
result from years of practice in the courts.
The lecture was the more appreciated on
that account, and every one was benefited
by it. On motion of F. B Moser, a vote
of thanks was tendered Mr. Wetzel, and
the heartiness of the vote evidenced plainly
how pleased the students were by the lecture.
The Allison Society has elected the following officers for the present society
term: President, Charles E. Daniels;
Vice-President, Charles G. Moyer; Secretary, Herman M. Sypherd; Treasurer,
Walter B. Freed; Prothonotary, Charles
McMeans; District Attorney, Daniel R.
Reese; Sheriff, J. 0. Haas; Justice of the
Peace, Edwin G. Hutchinson; Auditors,
J. Perry Wood and Merkel Landis; Executive Committee, G. H. Moyer, G.
Frank Wetzel and R. U. Capwell.

THE MOOT COURT.
BENJAMIN THOMAS vs. ARCHIBALD
FRANKLIN.
F,'audulent repmreentations by agent.Principal'sliability for same.-Toll of
the Statute of Limitations.
Trespass for deceit.
JACKSON ORLANDO HAAS-and CHARLES

OICMEANS for the plaintiff.

1. The fraud of the agent is imputable
to the defendant.-Bennett v. Judson, 21
N. Y., 238; Ind., Penn. & Chi. Ry. Co. v.
Tyn g, 63N. Y. 653; Garretzen v. Duencklel,
50 ifo. 104; Hart v. Bor. of Girard, 56 Pa.
23; Chonteaux v. Leech & Co., 18 Pa. 2294;
McNeile v. Cridland et. al., 168 Pa. 16;
Brooke v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co.,
108 Pa. 5.9.
2. The offer of $400 was an acknowledgment sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.-Palmer v. Gillespie, 95 Pa. 340;
Patton's Ex. v. Hassinger, 69 Pa. 311; Suter v. Sheeler, 22 Pa. 309; Burr v. Burr, 26
Pa. 284.
MARTINT R. HERR and DANIEL R.
REF.SE for the defendant.
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1. The representations of the agent were
not within the apparent scope of his authority.-Armor Co. v. Bruner & Baxter,
19N. J. E.831; Mooney v. Miller, 102 Mass.
217.
2. The right, of action is barred by the
statute of limitations.-Brightly's Purdon's Digest, 12 Ed., page 1213; Morgan
et. at. v. Tener et. al., 83 Pa. 305; Wickersham v. Lee et. al. 83 Pa. 416; Morrell v.
Trotter, 12 W. N. 0. 143; Trickett on
Limitations,
193; Harrisburg Bank v.
Forster, 8 Watts, 12.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On 3rd Feb. 1891, Franklin conveyed a
tract of land to Thomas, by a deed which
described it by courses and distances and
area. The area was stated to be "5 acres
31 perches more or less." The land within
the boundaries was in fact but 4 acres 153
perches. Two weeks prior to the conveyance, Amos Conkling, agent for Franklin,
made a contract with Thomas for the sale
of the tract to him. He told Thomas that
it contained 5 acres 31 perches; that a certain house which was in fact just beyond
it, was on it; that"a certain valuable spring
just beyond it, was on it, etc. The land,
if it had contained this house and spring,
would have been worth $2,500 more than
it was in fact worth. Thomas agreed to
pay and did pay $4,700 for the land.
Conkling had been employed to find a
purchaser, but had received no instruction
from Franklin as to the manner in which
he should induce a purchase. A few days
after the conveyance, Thomas, for the first
time had the land surveyed and discovered
that it did not embrace what it had been
said by Conkling to embrace. He complained to Franklin, who offered to appease him by paying him $400. This he
declined to accept. Finally, on March 19,
1897, this action of trespass for a deceit,
was brought. Defendant asks court to
require a verdict for defendant.
CHARGE OF COURT.

The gravamen of this action is the alleged fraud of Franklin upon Thomas.
Let us see whether the elements of fraud
may be discovered.
(1). There was a representatipn to the
effect that land sold, had upon it the house
and the spring.
(2). This representation was untrue.
The house and spring are not within the
boundaries of the premises.

(3). The representation was material.
The price paid by Thomas was $4,700.
Without the house and spring, the land
was worth $2,500 less than it would have
been with them. In the absence of otherevidence of the value of the land, the jury
would then be justified in concluding that
the land actually conveyed to Thomas
was worth $2,200. Features of it that
would have more than doubled its value
can scarcely be said to be otherwise than
material. Sutton v. Morgan, 158 Pa. 204;
Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353.
(4). That the representation was made,
in order to persuade Thomas to make the
purchase, might reasonably be inferred
from the fact that they were made by the
agent of the vendor to Thomas in the
course of the negotiation.
(5). Was the representation fraudulent?
The erroneousness of the representation
does not make it ipso facto fraudulent.
Kreiter v. Bomberger, 82 Pa. 59; Erie
'City Iron Works v. Barber, 106 Pa. 125;
Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353. It must
be made with knowledge of its falsity, or
with consciousness that the statement exceeds the knowledge of the person making
it. There must be "some moral wrong,"
Erie City Iron Works v. Barber, 106 Pa.
125; Freyer v. McCord, 165 Pa. 539. Is
there evidence of such knowledge on the
part of Franklin's agent?
We think
there is. He was agent for the sale of this
land. He made a sleeiflc statement to the
effect that a house and a spring were on
it. He may have believed that they were
on it. If so, we think there was no fraud.
He may have believed they were not on it;
he may have been conscious of ignorance
whether they were on it or not. In either
case, he would have attempted to commit
afraud. But whether the house and spring
were on the premises, one interested in
them, as owner or as agent of the owner,
might be presumed to know. We think
that, in the absence of evidence tending
to show ignorance on Conkling's part, the
jury may legitimately infer that he had
knowledge. Knowledge that a declaration concerning the area of land which
greatly exceeded the truth was false, was
primafacie presumable, in Griswold v.
Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353; Kreiter v. Bomberger, 82 Pa. 59. No facts appear elucidating how Conkling could have believed
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that the statement he made was true.
We see nothing in Keefe v. Sholl, 181 Pa.
90, inconsistent with this conclusion. The
jury must determine whether Conkling's representation was known by him
to be untrue, or in excess of his knowledge.
(6). Did the representation induce the
purchase by Thomas? If it did not, it did
him no injury. Frequently the vendee
himself testifies to the influence on .his act
of the representation.-Sutton v. iorgan,
158 Pa. 204; Boyd v. Shiffer, 156 Pa. 100,
and only he can have direct consciousness
of such influence. But the causal relation
of the representation to the act may be a
matter of inference. "If," says Jessel, Ml.
R., "it is a material misrepresentation,
calculated to induce him (the vendee) to
enteK into the contract, it is an inference
of law that be was induced by the representation to enter into it, and, in order to
take away his title to be relieved from the
contract on the ground that the representation was untrue, it must be shown either
that he had knowledge of the facts contrary to the representation, or that he
stated in terms and showed clearly by his
conduct that he did not rely on the representation." Redgrave v. Hurd, L. R. Oh.
D. 1 Cf. Holbrook v. Burt, 22 Pick. 546;
Tiedeman, Sales, 224. Afortiori, if it is
not an inference of law, it is at least one
which the jury may draw.
It was suggested that the land was open
to the inspection of Thomas, and that it
was negligent in him not to have examined it, and for this reason he cannot be
allowed to allege that he was imposed on
by the misrepresentation. But, itmatters
not how -gross his negligence, how foolish
his reliance on the statement of the vendor.
If he in fact relied, he must have redress.
Sutton v. Morgan, 158 Pa. 204; Redgrave
v. Hurd, 20 L. R. Ch. D. 1. The opportunity to discover the facts may be so full
as to make improbable the plaintift's assertion that he relied on the representation.
This can be its only effect.
The sale to Thomas, however, was made
through Conkling. Franklin had no direct communication with him.. Franklin
gave no instructionp to Conkling as to the
means to which he should resort to persuade purchasers. The serious question
then presents itself whether the fraudulent

representation of Conkling is imputable to
Franklin. It is so far imputable to Franklin, that Thomas would have a right to
rescind the contract, on the tender of a reconveyance, Freyer v. McCord, 165 Pa.
539; Sutton v. Morgan, 158 Pa. 204. But
is it imputable, as a fraud for which the
action for deceit would lie against him?
While some respectable authorities hold
its imputability in this sense, Huffcut,
Agency, 164, we think that in Pennsylvania that imputability is denied. Says
Mitchell J., "While the general rule that
the principal is liable for his agent's misrepresentation is unquestionable, as was
held in Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353,
yet the action of deceit being founded on
fraud or moral wrong, to sustain it against
the principal on such representations, the
fraud should be clear, and there should in
addition be some evidence of participation
or knowledge on the part of the principal
or circumstances which should have put
him upon inquiry." Freyer v. McCord,
165 Pa. 539. In Keefe v. Sholl, 181 Pa.
90, the court remarks on the want of proof
of knowledge of the falsity of the representation of the agent. "On the contrary
the defendant (the principal) called as on
cross-examination, testified positively that
she had no knowledge of the alleged false
statements," as if her innocence of them
would exempt her from liability. Remarking that the action for deceit is not
founded on the contract but on the "fraudulent representations and guilty knowledge, on the part of the defendbLnt," the
court adds "in the absence of any evidence
of such knowledge on her (the principal's)
part especially, there could be no recovery,"
and cites 165 Pa. 539 supra. For want of evidence of participation by Franklin in the
fraud practiced by Conkling we think
there can be no recovery against him.
The statute of limitations is invoked by
him. The conveyance took place on February 3, 1891. The land was surveyed a
few days afterward, and was then discovered not to contain the house and spring.
The action was brought on March 19,1897.
More than six years had then elapsed
since the survey. But, on Thomas' complaint to Franklin, the latter offered to
''appease him by paying him $400.' This
Thomas declined to accept. Does this
offer make a new starting point for the
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period of limitation? We think not. The
$400 were offered in satisfaction of the
claim, and were refused. It is well settled that an offer made by way of compromise will not toll the statute. In Currier
v. Lockwood, 40 Conn. 349, the rejected
offer of a ton of coal in paymept of a note
for $17.14 did not give a new starting point
to the statute. An offer to pay $7,000 in
settlement of an unliquidated claim was
similarly impotent; Bell v. Morrison, 1
Pet. 351, Cf.; Weston v. Hodgkins, 136
Mass. 326; Smith v. Eastman, 3 Cush. 355;
Slack v. Town of Norwich, 32 Vt. 818.
For the reasons stated, gentlemen of the
jury, your verdict should be for the defendant.
CHARLES BRADY vs. AUGUSTUS
SMALL.
Statute of Limitations.-Liabilityof Attorneyfor negligence in conducting suit.
Trespass.
W.

LLOYD SNYDER and B.

JOHNSTON-

MACEWEN for the plaintiff.
1. The statute of limitations does not
bar recovery.-Wickersham v. Lee et. at.
83 Pa. 416; Moore v. Juvenal, 92 Pa. 484;
Lichty v. Hugus, 55 Pa. 434; Vanhorn v.
Scott, 28 Pa. 316; Trickett on Limitations,
page 253.
2. Defendant's second request should not
be granted.-Cox v. Livingston, 2 W. &
S. 103; Godefroy v. Jay, 7 Bing. 413; 20 E.
C. L. 187; Gilbert v. Williams, 8 Mass. 51;
Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532.
EDWIN G. HUTCHINSON and ORIGEN
G.

MCANDLESS for the defendant.

1. The statute runs from the time of the
breach of duty.-Howell v. Young, 5
Barn. & Cress. 259 ; Wilcox v. Plummer,
29 U. S. 172; Moore v. Juvenal, 92 Pa. 484;
Derrickson v. Cady, 7 Pa. 27; Rhines v.
Evans, 66 Pa. 192; Hays v. Ewing, 70 Cal.
127.
2. The plaintiff must show that he could
have recovered in the former action.Quinn v. Van Pelt, 56 N. Y. 417; Brownfield v. Hughes, 128 Pa. 197; Cox v. Livingston, 2 W. & S. 103; Hallock v. Hastings, 13 Cal. 204: Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal.
542.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Charles Brady was run over by a railroad car ofthe X company on 3 May, 1890.
He employed Augustus Small, an attorney,
to bring suit against the company. The
suit was brought. No declaration was
ever filed and for this reason, under a rule

of court, on 11 January, 1891, a judgment
of non-suit was entered. Though aware of
this non-suit, Small never informed Brady
of it, but on the contrary, caused him to
believe that the suit was pending and
would be prepared for trial. Six years
elapsed, from 3 May, '90, before Brady
learned the fate of his action. He then
consulted another attorney who advised
him that it was now too late to sue again.
The present action was then brought on
August 12, 1897, against Small, for his
negligence. Brady proved the accident,
its consequences in his personal disablement, the pain and suffering, the inability
to work for 3 years after the accident; his
diminished earning power, his probable
length of life, his physician's bill, and
nursing expenses. He did not prove that
the negligence of the X company was the
cause of the injury. Small requested the
court to charge (1) the statute of limitations bars recovery, (2) the measure of
damages being what was lost by the alleged
negligence of defendant in the action
against the X company and there being no
evidence that anything could have been
recovered, in that action, there can be no
recovery, not even of nominal damages.
OPINION OF COURT.

The points of the defendant require us to
consider, in the first place, whether the
statute of limitations bars recovery. The
suit against the X company was begun on
May 3, 1890. A judgment of non-suit was
entered in this action on January 11, 1891,
in consequence of the omission ofAugustus
Small, the attorney for the plaintiff, to
file a declaration.
This negligence, (if
negligence it was) of Small, therefore, preceded January 11, 1891. The action was
brought on Aug. 12, 1897. If the negligence for which the suit is brought, is that
involved in the omission to file the declaration, the suit is primafacie barred.
It is suggested, however, that there was
a continuous negligence of the defendant.
He neglected his duty, it is said, not only
when he gave the occasion for the judgment of non-suit, but, also, when he failed,
subsequently to begin a new action, and
this most recent negligence took place
within the six years preceding the institution of the action. The cessation of the
suit begun on May 3, 1890, did not cause
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the loss of the damages which might have
been recovered in it, for the same damages
might have been recovered in a second.
The neglect to preserve the first action,
created a duty to commence a second, and
the omission to commence a second was
therefore a violation ofsuch duty for which
an action will lie. We donot think, however, that it is permissible to treat these
duties as distinct, and the violations of
them as independent causes of .action.
When an attorney collects money, it is his
duty to pay it over at once to his client,
but if he does not pay it over on the first
week after its receipt, it is his duty to pay
it over during the second week. If he
does not pay it over in the second week, it
is his duty to pay it over in the third
week. There is a continuing duty to pay
over, and there is a continuing negligence
in not paying over. However, the statute
of limitations bars an action against the
attorney for not paying the money to his
client, in six years from the time when he
was first negligent or derelict. Campbell
v. Boggs, 48 Pa. 524. When an attorney
receives a claim to collect, he should in a
reasonable time if necessary institute the
action. So soon as the reasonable time
runs by, he is guilty of negligence if he
has not brought the suit. The failure to
sue each successive year, month, week or
day, is a fresh negligence, or a continuation
of the former negligence. Nevertheless,
the statute of limitations will preclude an
action against the attorney for neglect to
sue, when six years have run from the
commencement of this negligence. Rhines
v. Evans, 66 Pa. 192 Cf.; Stephens v. Downey, 53 Pa. 424. Analogously we think,
the negligence of Augustus Small having
been continuous from his suffering the
action to lapse to his permitting a new
action to be made useless by the bar of the
statute, the statute barred this action as
soon as six years ran from the time when
actionable negligence was first consummated.
But, although Small was aware that the
case had been non-suited he never informed Brady thereof, but, on the contrary
caused him to believe that it was still
pending and would be prepared for trial.
Perhaps the failure of Small to inform
Brady, had the latter sought no information from him, would not have prevented

the running of the statute, Campbell v.
Boggs. 48 Pa. 524. Brady was not indifferent, but inquiring of him, was deliberately misled. Until he knew of the fact,
he was not apprised that he had any cause
of action, and only in six years from his
gaining this knowledge, would the statute
bar the action. Rhines v. Evans, 66 Pa.
192; Campbell v. Boggs, 48 Pa. 524; Glenn
v. Cuttle, 2 Gr. 273; McCoon v. Galbraith,
29 Pa. 293; Wickersham v. Lee, No. 1, 83
Pa. 416.
The second point requires us to consider
whether there can be a recovery because
of the plaintiff's failure to prove that had
the first action been duly prosecuted, it
would have resulted in a recovery. The
right to recover in that action, depended
on the negligence of the X company and
upon the exemption from negligence of
Charles Brady. But Brady, in this action,
has furnished no evidence upon these
questions. His present action is against
Small, for the consequences of his negligence. This consequence is the loss of the
damages which would have been recovered in the action against the X Co. Cox
v. Livingston, 2 W. & S. 103. It is a general principle, that in such an action the
negligence and its consequences must be
proven by the plaintiff. Are we to-assume
that the negligent act of Small was the
cause of an injurious consequence until
he shows that it was not? And are we
further to assume that the injurious consequence was the loss of the whole amount
for which the suit was being prosecuted?
Had the case been carried forward to trial
the.trial might have resulted in an adverse
verdict and judgment. And the judgment might have proven upcollectible because of the insolvency of the defendant.
We think it is incumbent on the plaintiff
at least to show the probability of a recovery, and of the solvency of the defendant. In Staples v. Staples, 85 Va. 76, it is
held that an attorney is liable only when
his negligence is shown, and to the extent
of the loss shown. He is not liable necessarily for the face of the claim. Cf. Hays
v. Ewing, 70 Cal. 127. The plaintiff must
show that his claim was a valid one, and
that it was collectible, 3 Am. & Eng. Ency.
392. We are not convinced that Godefroy
v. Jay, 7 Bing. 413, and Grayson v. Wilkinson, 5 Sm. & M. 268; 2 Sedgwick, Dam.
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569, which seem to hold that the burden
is on the attorney to show that there
could not have been a recovery, may be accepted as expressing the law. It would be
unreasonable to require Small to show how
the accident happened. Nothing appears
that reveals that he has ever been informed as to the witnesses on whom Brady
relied to prove the features of the accident.
As Brady has not shown the negligence
of the X company, and therefore has not
shown that had the suit againstit been
prosecuted, anything would have been recovered, we do not think the damages to
which he is entitled in this action are
such as would have compensated him for
his injuries, had the X Company been the
negligent cause of them.
Is Brady entitled to nominal damages?
For a breach of contract, the plaintiff
has a right to nominal damages, because
the breach independently of other damage,
is actionable. If the attorney's omission
to exercise care is to be regarded as a breach
of the contract, nominal damages should
be recoverable from him for it, and Godefroy v. Jay, 7 Bing. 413, and Cox v. Livingston, 2 W. & S. 103, both intimate that
such damages may be recovered. Vide 1
Sedgwick, Damages, 148. If then, the failure to file the declaration was not justified
by the neglect of the plaintiff to furnish
Small with the necessary information, or
by other facts, we think he is liable for
nominal damages.
J. A. KOHL'S ESTATE.
Exceptions to Valuation by Appraisers.
IARLIN WOLF and PAUL J. SCHMIDT
for plaintiff.
The court has the power to set appraisement aside if made below real value.Sleeper v. Nicholson, 1 Phila. 348: Vandevort's Appeal, 43 Pa. 462. Appraisers must
be well and truly w ithout prejudice or
partiality.-Leonard v. Cox, 64 Mo. 34;
Reiff's Appeal, 2 Barr (Pa.) 257. Creditor
may intervene and prevent confirmation
of appraisement.-Grave's Estate, 134 Pa.
377.
A. FRANK JOHN and FRANCIS S. LAF-

FERTY

for defendant.

Any creditor of the decedent may cite
the executors to account.-Peter's Estate,
1 Phila. 581; Shafer's Appraisers, 46 Pa. 131.
One of the appraisers being a nephew, can
not set aside the appraisement.-Vaandevort's Appeal, 43 Pa. 462; Macaltioner's

Estate, 26 W. N. C. 296. Only strong,
convincing proof can overcome valuefixed
by appraisers.-Fox1s*Estate, 5 Kulp 218;
Drygalski's Estate, 6 Kulp 50. Two appraisers is all that is required.-2 Rhone
0. C. Practice p. 363. Interest not allowed
on runnin- accounts before settlement.Smith v. Velie, 60 N. Y. 106.
OPINION OF COURT.

J. Adam Kohl died testate July 16, 1893.
A wife and three children survived him.
He owned a farm of 125 acres, and two lots
with houses erected on theif. He appointed his son Zwingle Kohl and another
executors. There werejudgments against
him at the time of his death amounting to
$2400. The farm has been sold for $1800.
On the widow's claim to $300 worth of
property, an appraisement of the lots and
houseswasmade. One of them was valued
by the appraisers at $200 and the other at
$100. Thejudgment creditors who cannot
be paid from the proceeds of thefarm except
to the appraisement (1) because a nephew
of the widow was one of the two appraisers; (2) because the lots werevalued at too
low a sum. On the part of the exceptants,
five depositions were taken, in which the
land appiaised is estimated as worth from
$600 to$800. Two witnesses for the widow
agreed that the valuation of the appraisers
was not too low.
The claim of the widow is based on the
5th section of the act of April 14, 1851, 1 P
& L. ]524. The act of April 8, 1859, 1 P.
L. 1528, directs that the same appraisers
that appraise the "other personal estate"
shall appraise the property taken by the
widow. The widow may take land, or
chattels, or both land and chattels. The
same appraisers that appraise the general
estate will appraise land that is elected by
the widow. And we doubt not that when,
as here, there is no personal estate, the appraisers of the real estate taken by the
widow will be as in other cases two in number and will be appointed by the same authority.
(1) It would be more in harmony with
the principle that one is not to be a judge
of his own cause that the selection of persons to appraise the property to be taken
by the widow should not be made by her.
The law, however, has given the administrator the right to choose the appraisers
even when, being the widow, she intends
to claim the exempt property, e. g. Macal-
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tioner's Estate, 26 W. N. C. 296. There is
always room to suspect that the persons
appointed by her will be at least friendly.
Even the bias of relationship'is not per se
a disqualification. That one of the appraisers is her brother-in-law does not make him
incompetent.--Vandevort's Appeal, 43 Pa.
462. A surety on the bond of the administratrix, who is the widow, may be an appraiser, although he is under an appreciable
predisposition to be liberal towards the
widow, and thus diminish the assets for
which he may be liable. We cannot set
aside this appraisement because one of the
appraisers was a nephew of the widow.
(2) Is the appraisement inadequate?
With respect to nothing are the judgments
of men more apt to differ than the value
of things, and few appraisements would
stand if the courts yielded easily to the
proofs of their inadequacy. The court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the
appraisers unless the evidence clearly requires it.-Davenport's Estate, 4 Kulp 255;
Dixon's Estate, 1 Kulp 141. While creditors, the fund for the payment of whose
debts is diminished by tile abstraction of
the exempt property, Graves' Estate, 134
Pa. 377; Runyan's Appeal, 27 Pa. 121,
Himes' Appeal, 94 Pa. 381, Williams' Estate, 141 Pa. 436; Baldy's Appeal, 40 Pa.
328, or a devisec, Kern's Appeal, 120 Pa.
523,may exceptto the appraisement because
of its inadequacy, the burden is upon them
to support their exceptions by the proof.
O'Neill's Estate, 1 D. R. 392; Macaltioner's
Estate, 26 W. N. 0. 296. If the appraisement is set aside, the court cannot by itself
or by an auditor make a substitute, Davis'
Estate, 5 Kulp 162, Vandevort's Appeal,
43 Pa. 462, but would have to require the
administrator to appoint other appraisers,
whose appraisement might again be assailed. Is there then sufficient grqund to
overturn the appraisement in this case?
Five men think the property worth at
least twice as much as the valuation placed
on it. On the other hand, the two appraisers acted under oath and official responsibility, and their judgment is corroborated
by two witnesses. In Drygalski's Estate,
6 Kulp 50, two witnesses appraised the
property which at $250 had been set apart
to the widow, at $700, while in Bobb's
Estate, 1 Wood w. 317, five witnesses testified to a higher value than that assigned

by the appraisers. Three witnesses supported the estimate of the appraisers. In
neither was the appraisement set aside.
Here a majority of one of the witnesses
condemns the appraisement. We do not
think, however, that we should set it aside.
The exceptions will be dismissed, and the
appraisement confirmed. Runyan's Appeal, 27 Pa. 121; Sellers' Estate, 82 Pa. 153;
Himes' Appeal, 94 Pa. 381.
COAM. TO USE OF AMOS ATTOLE vs.
ALEX. McCOY, et. al.
Sureties on administrator's bond-Guarditan an improperperson to bring an action on bond.
Assumpsit.
FRED C. MILLER and Wm. l. FLANNIGAN for plaintiff, cited:
1. Failure on the part of the administrator to file his bond within thirty days,
works a forfeiture of the bond.-Commonwealth v. Bryan, 8 S. & R. 127.
2. Tht executor of an administrator can
not be charged as the representative of the
original intestate.-Arlin v. Miller, 22 Ga.
330; Scott v. Fox 14 Ind. 388.
3. As to duty of the executor of an administrator see Smith v. Moore, 4 N. J.

Eq. 485.

WALTER G. TREIBLY and V. J. HENRY
for the defendant, cited:
1. The estate of a deceased administrator is not liable for the subsequent acts
of
his personal
Appeal,
56 Pa. representatives.-Stephens'
409.
2. The guardian is not the proper person to bring the action.-Drenkle v. Shorman, 9 Watts 485; Commonwealth v. Barnitz, 9 Watts 257; (onnelly's Appeal, 1
Grant 366.
3. Foster's failure to perform duty was
in his capacity as guardian.-Warfield v.
Beard, 13 Bush. (Ky.) 77.

OPINION OF COURT.
On Nov. 14, 1893, William Bowman died
intestate. A widow Annie, and a child 3
years of age, named Frank, survived him.
One month after Bowman's death, his
widow received letters of administration on
his estate. She entered into a bond for
$6000, with Alex. McCoy and Peter Snagel
assureties. Nearly three months after the
grant of letters, the administratrix died,
not having filed inventory or account.
She left a will in which she appointed her
brother, Frank Foster, executor and guardian of her son Frank. After receiving letters testamentary, Foster stated an account
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of Annie Bowman, as administratrix of
William Bowman. This account showed
a balance in his hands of the estate of William Bowman of $3287.88. On July 21,
1894, on the report of an auditor, the court
decreed the payment of the balance to "an
administrator d. b. n. of the estate of Win.
Bowman to be appointed." No such adiinistrator has ever been appointed. Foster has wasted the fund and absconded.
He has since been removed from the
guardianship of Frank Bowman, and
Amos Attole has been substituted. This
action is on the bond of Annie Bowman,
against her sureties.
Several objections are urged by the defendants to a recovery. (1) It is said that
as Foster was both executor and guardian
and was in the former capacity bound to
pay over tihe fund to himself in the latter
capacity, he will be presumed to have done
so, and the sureties on his guardian's bond
are liable only. This position neglects
two important facts. (a) As guardian,
Foster had no right to receive the money
from himself as executor. If assets are
unchanged, chattels, etc., the administrator d. b. n. has the right to receive
them in specie, from his predecessor or
from the executor or administrator of
such predecessor.-Sibbs v. Phila. Saving
Fund Society, 153 Pa. 345; Potts v. Smith,
3 R. 361; Allen v. Irwin, 1 S. & R. 549.
Unconverted stock, or its value, may be
recovered by the administrator d. b. n.
from the administrator of the original.administrator, although no account has been
settled of the trust.-Lewis v. Ewing, 18
Pa. 313. When assets have been converted
by the administrator, his executor may retain the proceeds until the settlement of
the account, Slaymaker v. Farmers' National Bank, 103 Pa. 06;andif the administrator causes a deposit in bank in the
name of the intestate, to be transferred to
his account as administrator, the credit in
his name is regarded as the proceeds of the
conversion of the deposit previously standing in the intestate's name, and the administrator may retain it, as against the
administrator d. b. n. until his account is
settled.-Sibbs v. Phila. Saving Fund Society, 153 Pa. 345.
After the account of the administration
by the original administrator has been
settled, the balance therein shown to be

due the estate is payable to the adminlstrator d. b. n. Section 31, Act Feb. 24,
1834, 1 P. & L. 1493; Little v. Walton, 23
Pa. 164. In Croyell v. Blackfan, 1 Pittsb.
327, after a decree of distribution of a balance shown by an administrator's account
to be in his hands, he was removed from
office. The decision of the court below,
that, on the subsequent appointment of an
administrator d. b. n., the balance was
payable to him, rather than to the distributees designated in the decree, was affirmed
by an equally divided Supreme Court. It
is entirely clear that the money in the custody of Frank Foster, as executor, was
payable, not to the guardian of his nephew,
but to an administrator d. b. n. There is
no presumption therefore that he paid it
over to himself as guardian.
But (b) the court decreed that he should
pay the balance to "the administrator d.
b. n. to be appointed."
It will not be
gratuitously assumed that he paid it over
to some one else. It appears then that
there can be no recovery at the suit of the
use-plaintiff.
(2) Against any recovery at all it is
urged that there has been no default on the
part of the administratrix, and that for
this only, are she and her sureties liable.
The liabilities of the sureties are to be determined by a fair interpretation of the
bond. The bond (See. 24, Act March 15,
1832, 1 P. & L 1468) stipulates for (1) the
exhibition in the register's office, within
30 days, of a true inventory; (2) well and
truly administering the goods, chattels,
and credits according to law; (3) making
a just account within one year; (4) delivering and paying over "unto such person or
persons as the said orphans' court, by their
decree or sentence pursuant to law, shall
limit and appoint" all the rest and residue of goods, chattels and credits remaining in the administrator's account, etc.
The first of these stipulations was violated. No inventory was filed in the life
of Annie Bowman. The bond is therefore
forfeited. Com. v. Bryan, 8 S. & R. 127.
Judgment would have to be entered for
the penalty, had the suit been brought by
the proper party, and the damages assessed
by the jury.
It does not appear that any damage was
caused by the neglect to file the inventory.
Nor is it evident that any devastavit was
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committed by Mrs. Bowman. If she had
converted the assets into money, and they
were in her custody as money or were
standing in her name in the bank, her
executor had a right to receive them, and
hold them, even as against an administrator d. b. n. Sibbs v. Phil. Savings
Fund, 153 Pa. 345. If the administratord. b.
n. could not have prevented this, neither could the sureties on Mrs. Bowman's
bond have prevented it. If assets of Bowman's estate remained unconverted at.Annie Bowman's death, the right to them in
specie passed to the administrator d. b. n.
Her executor had no power to take them,
and convert them, and administer them.
Bowman's Appeal, 62 Pa. 166. We must
infer then from the settlement of the account in the orphans' court, that it embraces only what was properly inserted in
it, the moneys in the hands of the administratrix. There was no devastavit of
the estate until after Annie Bowman's
death, and, so far as appears, the sureties
upon her bond could not have withdrawn
the assets from the hands of her executor.
How long time elapsed until he filed the
account, does not appear.
Probably if one administrator is superseded by another on account of his dismissal, etc., he, and his sureties, would remain bound for the delivery of the assets
to his successor. He would have custody
of theni, until he passed it over to the
latter. But, it is difficult to see how an
administratrix, who dies, is liable for the
eloignment, or spoliation of the property by
her executor oradministrator. And, if she
is not bound for such post-mortem eloignment or spoliation, her sureties cannot well
be, for their responsibility is exactly commensurate with hers. "No action can be
maintained on the bond of a deceased administrator for the assets of his intestate
on hand and caprble of identification at
his death, or for waste and mismanagement after his death." 7 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. 229, citing State v. Rottaken, 34
Ark. 144. It would be a hardship to make
persons who become responsible for the
acts of A., and who contemplate no wider
liability, responsible also for the acts of B.
Doubtless thee ought to be some security
against such acts as are here disclosed. If
the sureties of the primary administrator
are not liable, those of her executor or ad-

ministrator should be. But, if neither of
these classes is, there is a easus onisus in
the law. it is not just by a lax construction of the bond to impose a liability on
persons who did not voluntarily assume
it.
Cf. Stephens' Appeal, 56 Pa. 409.
For the first reason, that the action is
not begun by the proper party, there can
be no recovery.

SAMUEL RUSH vs. ADAM TAYLOR.
Retention of possession after sale -Fraud
on creditors-Executions issued after
sale.
Feigned issue.

ROBERT STUCKER and B. FRANK FENTON for John Lippincott.
1. Retention of possession is conclusive
evidence of fraud on creditors.-Garman
v. Cooper & Co., 72 Pa. 32; Miller v. Garman, 69 Pa. 134.
2. As the sale was fraudulent as to both
creditors, Lippincott, having prior judgment and the earlier execution, should be
paid fimt.-Welsh v. Murray, 4 Dahas 320;
Appeal of John Jacobs, 107 Pa. 137; Watt
v. Steel, 1 Pa. 386.
FRANK H. STRAUSS and HER3AN M.
SYPIHERD for Samuel Rush.
1. Sale was void-retention of possession.-Clow v. Woods, .5 S. & R. 275; Babt
v. Clemson, 10 S. & R. 428; Young v. McClure, 2 V. & S. 150; McKiblen v. Martin,
64 Pa. 352; Garman v. Cooper, 72 Pa. 32;
Bentz v. Rockey, 69 Pa. 71.
2. Goods are not subject to levy when
the party has notice of the bailment.Billingsley v. White, 59 Pa. 464.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Adam Taylor, carrying on a retail shoe
business, made a bill of sale of all his stock
and fixtures to one of his creditors, Charles
Frome, in partial payment of the debt.
The debt was $4,700, and the stock was accepted by Frome. at $4,500, credit to this
extent being allowed to Taylor. Under
an agreement with Frome, Taylor continued in the store, making sales to customers as before, and accounting for the
proceeds to Frome. Nothing was done
about the premises to indicate to others
that the sale had occurred. Two weeks
after this sale, John Lippincott obtained a
judgment for $1,334, and although he was
aware of the arrangement between Taylor
and Frome, issued an execution and directed the sheriff to levy on the store goods.
Samuel Rush also obtained a judgment
for $3,997 and issued an execution, on the
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day following that on which Lippincott
issued execution. The sheriff sold the
store goods on both of these writs, and the
proceeds, $4,493, are in court for distribution. It has been agreed by the parties
that Frome may take the proceeds, as the
sale to him is valid against the executions.
Rush and Lippincott allege that it was
invalid as against them, but Rush contends that it was valid as to Lippincott,
and invalid as to himself, and therefore
that he should receive the proceeds.
The sale to Frome was not fraudulent.
The debt of $4,700 existed. Thegoods were
honestly appraised at $4,500. Taylor and
Frome intended, to this extent, to satisfy
the debt. No fraud upon others was contemplated, and the facts do not make
fraud possible.
But, there is what is called fraud in.law,
and we are to inquire whether it tainted
the sale. Fraud in law is not fraud. It is,
rather, something whose existence, though
it be not fraud, produces the same effects
that fraud, if present, would produce. If
fraud were present, it would make the sale
voidable by the creditors injured by it.
Are there any facts attending this sale,
which, though it be free from fraud, impart to it the same voidableness by creditors ?
The prior relation of debtor and creditor,
between vendor and vendee, and the circumstance that the price paid was a portion of the existing debt, does not vitiate
it. Pressel v. Bice, 142 Pa. 263; Garretson
v. Hackenberg, 144 Pa. 107; Goddard v.
Well, 165 Pa. 419; 8 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
856.
The fact that the vendor is indebted,
does not preclude his selling; nor that in
addition, he is insolvent. 8 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. 856. The law has given to creditors a means of preventing sales becoming
effectual as against them. They may acquire what is known as a lien. But the
debt itself is not a lien. Nor is the judgment which may result from the action
founded upon the debt a lien upon the
debtor's chattels. The sale to Frone, however, was made before Lippincott's and
Rush's judgments were recovered.
Pennsylvania is one of the few states
that still adhere to the principle that the
sale of a chattel shall be void as.to a creditor of the vendor, who chooses to insist

that it shall be void if the chattel is not at
once delivered to the vendee. Tiedeman,
Sales 113. For some time there has been a
reluctance to apply this principle, and
numerous qualifications and exceptions
have been introduced. McGuire v. James,
143 Pa. 521; Goddard v. Weil, 165 Pa. 419;
Crawford v. Dairs, 99 Pa. 576. We think
however, that the facts disclosed in the
case before us, do not except it. No change
of signs was made; Taylor continued in the
store making sales as before fortw weeks.
There was nothing to suggest to the
world that the proprietorship of the stock
of goods had passed to Frome, nor do we
see anything in the circumstances to show
the unfeasibility of the adoption of some
tokens or badges of the sale.
The sale to Frome, though honest, was
a secret sale. What effect would this
secrecy produce, as respects Rush and Lippincott? Their debts bad probably been
contracted before the sale. Neither it, nor
the manner of it, therefore influenced
them in giving credit. The secrecy of the
sale could not injure them except by preventing such steps to collect their debts,
as a knowledge of the sale would have
probably led them to adopt. This possible
injury does not vitiate the sale. No injury which the law appreciates takes
place until the creditor incurs expense in
issuing an execution. If the sale remains
secret until then, it is voidable by the
creditor: if it is made public before then,
a later execution will not entitle the creditors-to annul it. The object ofthe requirement that though the sale is honest, it
shall be accompanied by a change of the
possession of the thing sold, is to advise
creditors and purchasers whose policies
may be adopted in ignorance of it. In ignorance of the sale, one may buy the chattel
still in the vendor's possession from him.
As to him the vendee cannot claim it. In
ignorance of the sale, a creditor may issue
an execution and direct a levy upon the
chattel. As to him, the vendee cannot
claim it. The change of possession then,
is a means of notice; a means; not the only
means; not even the best means. When
other, equally good means of notice exist,
change of possession is not indispensable.
When A conveys land to B, and again to C,
C's title will be good, unless B has made it
conveniently possible for C to know of his
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purchase, either by taking possession of
JONATHAN R. SMITH, BLAKE IRVIN
and ROBERT H. BARKER for the plaintiff.
the land, or, by recording his deed, or by
1. The plaintiff is not required to show
express information.
C's knowledge of
that he could have recovered against Wilthe previous conveyance, is the object to
cox and company.-Godfroy v. Jay, 7
be accomplished. If he has it without
Bing. 187.
recording the deed and without taking
2. Even if no actual damages are shown
possession, these are unnecessary. If B
nominal damages may be recovered. -Cox
v. Livingston, 2 W. & S. 103.
has taken possession, and thus invites C
3. The question of negligence should
to apply to him for information, neither
have been submitted to the jury.- Berg v.
the recording nor actual notice is necesAbbott, 83 Pa. 177; Godfroy v. Dalton, 6
Bing. 460; Rights, Remedies, and Pracsary. The same principle applies to a sale
tice, 1 Vol. 303; Dearborn v. Dearborn, 15
of a chattel. Frome's possession would
Mass. 315: Bastian v. Phila. .180 Pa. 227.
have been a means of knowledge to LipROBERT W. IRVING, HUGH K. MILLER
pincott and to Taylor. But, knowledge is
and ALFRED J. FEIGHT for the defendbetter than the means of knowledge.
ant.
Before Lippincott issued his execution,
The plaintiff cannot recover damages
he knew of the sale to Frome. As that
from the defendant, his attorney, for hegligence in the trial of a cause, unless he also
sale was honest, the only thing that could
prove- that, but for the defendant's neglect,
impair it would have been his want of the
the action could have been successfully
means of conveniently knowing it. But,
maintained.-Brownfield v. Hughes, 128
Pa. 194; Ballard v. New York, etc. R. Co.,
he knew it. He needed therefore no other
126 Pa. 141; Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542;
means. When he issued his execution
and directed the sheriff to levy on these Hastings v. Halleck, 13 Cal. 204.
A full statement of the facts appears in
goods, he attempted to deprive Frome of
the opinion of the court.
them. To allow him to succeed would be
to assist him to frustrate the policy of the
OPINION OF THE COURT.
law which allows a creditor to obtain a
From the testimony offered on behalf
preference over other creditors, by obtainof the plaintiff, James Brooks, it appeared
ing payment of the debt, and would be to that he was
employed in the mill of Wilcox
say that such a preference can be obtained
& Co. in the year 1889; that while so emby afifa but cannot be obtained by a sale,
ployed he was injured by one of the maeven though it be known to the issuer of
chines used by the said Wilcox and Co.,
thefifa. The sale to Frome is clearly good
and the amputation of his right arm renas against Lippincott.
dered necessary in consequence thereof.
Lippincott has no right to the fund as
Believing that the accident was due to the
against Frome. But, he has the earlier
negligence of the owners in not providing
execution, and for this reason. 'his right to
reasonable and proper safeguards for their
the money is superior to that of Rush.
machinery, Brooks employed William
Only in one point is Rush more advanta- Brown, the defendant, who was
an attorgeously situated. He was ignorant of the
ney-at-law, to bring an action against Wilsale. After some reflection we have decox and Co. for the recovery of the damcided that the principle found in 1 Liens,
ages he had sustained, in the Common
297, and 3 Liens, 365, that when claim a
Pleas of Dauphin County. Brown filed a
is superior to b, and b is superior to c, a,
praecipe on the 10th day of August, 18S9,
though inferior to c alone, will be superior
and the service of a summons was had on
to both b and c, is not applicable. The
the defendants. No statement of the
claim of Rush must be paid from the money
cause of action was filed. The rules of the
in court, and the residue awarded to
Court provided that if no statement be filed
Frome.
for six months after
JAMTES BROOKS vs. WILLIAM BROWN.
E vidence-Damages-Veglect of an attorney.
Trespass.
Motion to take off non-suit.

the institution of a
suit, thata judgment of nonpros may be
entered on motion of the defendant. This
was done on behalf of Wilcox & Co. on the
first day of March, 1890. The plaintiff
had no knowledge of it until January 1,
1896-more than six years had then elapsed
since his right of action had accrued against
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Wilcox & Co. Upon the presentation of

Moore v. Juvenal, 92 P. S. 484. Our duty
these proofs the plaintiff rested his case.
in the case is plain and imperative to susThe defendant then moved the court to
tain the plaintiff's motion.
enter a compulsory non-suit, on the ground
And now, 17th January, 1897, it is orthat the plaintiff was not entitled to re- dered that the compulsory non-suit entered
cover damages from the defendant, because
be taken off.
he had not shown that he would have
been entitled to recover from Wilcox &
JOSEPH MOORE vs. ABRAM KELLOGG.
Co.
Adverse possession- Vendor and vendee
The court being of the opinion that the
-Boundaries.
burden was on the plaintiff as contended
for by the defendant, entered a non-suit
Trespass.
and the motion before us is to take off the
THOMAS B. PEPPER and CHAS. G.
same, on the ground that the action of the
MOYER for the plaintiff.
court was erroneous.
Continued possession of the vendor is
not adverse to his vendee until some uneThe plaintiff contends that in any event,
he was under the evidence enlitled to re- quivocal, hostile act is brought to the
knowledgeof the owner.-Ingles v. Ingles,
cover nominaldamages from the defend150 Pa. 397; Connor v. Bell, 152 Pa. 444;
ant.
That in considering the present
Olwine v. Holman, 23 Pa. 279; Buckholder
motion it is immaterial whether the bur- v. Sigler, 7 W. &S. 154; Jackson v. Burton,
den was on the plaintiff, (in order to en- I Wend. 341; Doe v. Butler, 3 Wend. 150;
Cadwalader v. App, 81 Pa. 194; Bannon v.
title him to substantial damages), to show
Brandon, 34 Pa. 263; Zeller's Lessee v.
that there might have been a recovery by
Eckart, 4 How. 288; Main Tp. School v.
Reichard, 142 Pa. 226; Tamm v. Kellogg,
him against Wilcox & Co.. or not. It is
49 Mo. 118.
insisted that there was evidence of a
SAXIUEL B. HARE and WALTER B.
neglect or breach of duty on part of Brown,
FREED for the defendant.
and that this established a cause of action
1. The boundaries actually fixed on the
and it was the duty of the court to have land are the true boundaries.-Hall v.
submitted the case to the jury.
Powel, 4 S. & R. 456; Yoder v. Fleming, 2
Yeates 311; Tamm v. Kellogg, 49 Mo. 1!8;
With this view we now coincide.-An
Burrell v. Burrell, 11 Mass. 293; Potts v.
examination of adjudicated cases clearly
Everhart, 26 Pa. 493.
establishes the Law of Pennsylvania to
2. Open, notorious, and uninterrupted
be, that when an attorney has been negli- possession up to a boundary line, although
not the true one, for the statutory period,
gent, to the detriment of his client, -the
cultivating the land, and taking the profcause of action is the breach of duty and
its, will give a good title.-Tamm v. Kelnot the damages sustained which are only
logg, supra; Dem, ex Dem Saxton et. al.
an incident." Lavall v. Groman, 180 P.
v. Hunt, 20 N. J. L. 487; Cooper v. Smith,
9 S. & R. 25; Hole v. Rittenhouse, 25 Pa.
S. 540. Here there was a failure to secure
491; Susquehanna Coal Co. v. Quick, 61
a loan by a first lien as stipulated. The
Pa. 328.
time for payment of the loan, however,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
had not arrived when the action was
brought against the attorney.
In 1867 Henry Storthing owned a tract
In Miller v. Wilson, 24 P. S. 114, there of land in the borough of X 150 feet wide
had been a failure on part of an attorney
on the main street and 140 feet deep. On
to record a mortgage until the property
the lot stood a house 22 feet wide, the west
was otherwise encumbered. The Court
side of which was 30 feet from the west
says "It was argued that the plaintiff had
line of the lot. Fifty-two feet east of the
not as yet suffered any loss from the deeastern side of the house was a paling fence,
fendant's violation of duty. But we hold
running at right angles with the main
it clear law that the attorney subjected
street, and parallel with the side of the
himself to an immediate action. The right
house. The ground between this fence
of action in such case accrues at the time
and the western side of the lot was used as
when the contractor duty of the defendant
a yard for the house, being in part sodded,
is violated."
in part planted with flowers, and in part
"The breach of duty and not the conse- paths. The remainder of the lot was
quential damage is the cause of action."planted with vegetables. On August 7,
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1867, Storthing conveyed a portion of this
lot to Joseph Moore. The deed described
the land conveyed as bounded by a line
running from the eastern corner along
Mfain St. for the space of 68 feet by lines
running perpendicular to this, from both
termini, 140 feet, and by a line parallel to
the first, 68 feet long. Moore took possession of the part between the paling fence
and the eastern line, cultivating it for a'
series of years. In 1887 he erected a house
on it 30 feet wide, the eastern end being 10
feet from the eastern line of the lot. Five
years after this, Moore removed the
paling fence to a line 68 feet west qf the
eastern line of the lot. Meantime, Storthing had conveyed the other portion of the
lot to Kellogg. Kellogg, on the day following Moore's removal of the fence, set it
back to its former position. After the conveyance by Storthing, he and Kellogg
continued to use the land between the paling fence and the western line, with the
residue of the western part of the lot, as
before, as a yard and garden. Moore having brought this action of trespass q. c. f.
and obtained a verdict, we are asked to
award a new trial for errors of law.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Storthing's lot was 150 feet wide. A
paling fence ra across it perpendicular to
Mlain street, at the distance of 46 feet from
and rarallel with the eastern boundary of
the lot. His deed of Aug. 7, 1867, purported to convey so much of this land as
was inclosed by a line parallel with the
eastern side, at the distance therefrom of
68 feet, and that side. The tract thus conveyed, therefore, embraced 22 feet west of
the fence. Had the fence been described
in the deed as a boundary, the grant would
have been confined to the land to the east
of it, despite the circumstance that the
distance of 68 feet would have gone 22 feet
beyond it. But, the fence was not called
for as a limit. Hence, there being nothing to control the distance, the grantee,
Moore, became the owner of the eastern
part of the tract, of a width of 68 feet.
Breneiser v. Davis, 134 Pa. 1.
Ioore then, becoming the owner on
Aug. 7, 1867, of the land on which the fence
stood, had a right in 1892 to remove it to
the western margin of that land, unless by
some act, he had ceased at that day to be

the owner. He had not conveyed it. The
cessation of his ownership is suggested to
have occurred on account of the continued
possession of the western part of the lot up
to the fence, by the grantor Storthing and
his alienee Kellogg, for a period exceeding
21 years. A house stood on this western
portion, and the ground between the fence
and the western boundary, had been prior
to the conveyance and was at the time
thereof used in connection with the house
It was in part
as a lawn and garden.
sodded with grass, in part planted with
flowers and vegetables and in part laid
out into paths. The house and the lawn
and the garden were thus in the possession of Storthing and his grantee Kellogg
for the 25 years intervening between the
conveyance to Moore and his removal of
the fence. But, was this possession adverse? A vendor may remain in possession of all or some of the land conveyed
adversely to his vendee and thus destroy
the vendee's title. Limitations, 70, but
the mere retention of possession will not
be deemed hostile. "The retention of the
possession by the grantor will be regarded
as provisional, and in subordination to the
will of the grantee, until the former commits some act of hostility which plainly
indicates to the latter the intention to
deny his right." Ibid 71; Kern v. Howell,
180 Pa. 315; Ingles v. Ingles, 150 Pa. 397;
Conner v. Bell, 152 Pa. 444; 01wine v.
Holman, 23 Pa. 279; Buckholder v. Sigler,
7 W. & S. 154. In Conner v. Bell, supra.A
had sold from a larger tract, a piece of land
but continued to occupy the residue of the
land and, in conjunction with it, a portion
of the piece conveyed four feet wide at
one end, and tapering to a point, up to a
fence. This occupancy was after the conveyance what it had been before. It was not
adverse. "If," says M Collum, J., quoting
from 01wine v. Holman, upra, "he (the
grantor) wishes to change the character of
the possession, he must manifest his intention by some act of hostility to the title
of his vendee, plainly indicating to the
latter the intention to deny his right, and
to hold adversely to it."
The date of the conveyance from
Storthing to Kellogg is not ascertained.
That conveyance granted to Kellogg only
the portion of the tract not previously conveyed to Moore. Such conveyance was
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perhaps an implied disclaimer by Storthing and by Kellogg of any part of the
land previously conveyed to Moore. We
cannot regard the continuance of the possession by Kellogg as hostile. But even
if the possession of Kellogg was hostile, it
does not appear that it had continued
for 21 years, when the trespass complained
of by Moore was committed, or when the
verdict was rendered. He who seeks to
defeat a right by adverse possession, must
show its existence for the statutory period.
No error was therefore committed by the
court in the trial of the action. The rule
for a new trial is discharged, and judgment is directed to be entered upon the
verdict.

1895. It is further agreed, by the party of
the first part, Arnold, that Creelin may
and can dispose of or sell to responsible
parties, the fixtures and good will of said
bottling shop." A bottler's license had
been taken outby Arnold, in January 1893,
but it was agreed between him and Creelin
that the latter would not insist on a transfer of it to him. Creelin took immediate
'possession of the shop, which he retained
until February 15, 1894, when Arnold made
a lease of the shop to Frank Tully, selling
to him the good will and fixtures for $150.
Creelin had spent $60 in supplying the
house with water pipes and drainage.
This assumpsit is brought by Creelin to
recover as damages for the breach of the
terms of the contract by Arnold, the $60
thus expended and the $150, the price of the
CHARLES CREELIN vs. JAMES
good will and fixtures received by Arnold.
ARNOLD.
So far as appears, the lease, if it had not
Lessor and lessee-Illegality of contractbeen accompanied by the agreement that
Damages-vidence.
Arnold's license should not be transferred
Assumpsit.
to Creelin, would have been valid. It gave
G. FRED. VOWINKLE and J. KIRK Bos- to Creelin the right of possession until
LER for plaintiff.
April 1, 1895. The dispossession of Creelin
Where a contract is capable of two constructions, the one making it valid, and on February 15, 1894, by Arnold and his
new lessee, Tully, was therefore wrongful.
the other, void, it is clear law that the
first should be adopted.
Lorrilard v.
He might have regained the possession by
Clyde, et. at. 86 N. Y. 387; Wharton on
the action of ejectment. But, a tenant,
Contracts, pg. 338-9. The sale of liquors
by a licensed dealer is a lawful business when he has been evicted, is not limited
and a loan made to carry on such a busi- to the ejectment. He may, if he chooses,
ness is not against public policy. Brewing
refrain from all steps to re-occupy the premCo. v. Booth, 162 Pa. 100.
ises, and he may sue the evicting landlord
PsImP E. RADLE and GEORGE W. Au- for damages.-Trull v. Granger, 8 N. Y.
BREY for defendant.
115.
Plaintiff was obliged to have license.
Creelin's right to maintain an action
Act June 9, 1891, P. L. 257. It is illegal
upon the lease is contested because of his
to carry on distilling or brewing without
license. Act April 10, 1849, P. L. 570. The
agreement with Arnold, at the execution
purpose being illegal, the lease was void.
of the lease, not to require a transfer of the
Ernst v. Crosby, 140 N. Y. 365. If any
part of an indivisible promise is illegal, the license. A sale of liquors without a license
is illegal; and the license granted in Janwhole is illegal. Clark on Contracts, p.
481-492; Filson's Trustees v. Ames, 5 Barr
uary of 1893, to Arnold, was an authority
452. A landlord is not liable for work done
to him, but not to the house, to sell. His
by mechanic at tenant's request.-FoRuM,
successor in the possession of the premises
Vol. I, p. 76; Moore v. Weber, 71 Pa. 429.
acquired no right to prosecute the business
OPINION OF THE COURT.
in virtue of that license, unless he was subOn Nov. 15, 1893, Arnold, by a writing, stituted for Arnold in respect to it, i. e.
"for the consideration of $20 per month,
unless it was transferred to such successor
lets or rents to Creelin from Nov. 15, 1893,
by the court of quarter sessions.-Section
to April 1, 1895, a house known as house 7, Act April 20, 1858, 1 P. & L. 2722; BluiNo. 2 of Arnold's property, to be used as a
menthal's Petition, 12.5 Pa. 412. If Creelin
bottling shop. It is further agreed that and Arnold intended that the former
Creelin shall hold and possess all the fix- should sell liquors before he obtained a litures, appliances and utensils and the good
cense, they intended anunlawful act and as
will of the said bottling shop until April 1,
this intention accompanied the formation
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of thelease, which was the means by which
it was to be carried into effect, the lease
itself was infected with illegality. No
right of action can spring, directly, e. g.
for the rent, or indirectly, e. g. upon the
the covenant for quiet enjoyment, broken
by an eviction, from it. Clark, Contracts,
392, etpassim.
But, an intention to commit a crime is
not to be lightly imputed to Creelin. It
appears simply that Creelin was not to
insist on a transfer of Arnold's license to
him. But, was he to sell liquor without a
license? Or did he accept the lease in
November, with the object of not coinmencing business on the premises until,
seven or eight weeks later, he obtained a
license from the court? We are unable to
infer from the not insisting on a transfer
of Arnold's licence, the purpose to sell
without a license. The facts warrant a suspicion of the existence of such a purpose;
nothing more. If Creelin in fact sold
liquors in the interval between November
15th, and the license court, this would
have strengthened the suspicion that such
sales were in the contemplation of the
parties. But, that such sales were made
is purely conjectural. We find nothing,
therefore, to prevent the enforcement of
the contract of lease.
Creelin has been evicted by the joint act
of Arnold his lessor, and Tully. The measure of damages for such eviction, would be
what, as Sharswood, J., says, the term
"would be worth to an assignee who would
assume the payment of the rent," Dyer v.
Wightman, 66 Pa. 425; the difference between the value of the lease, and the rent
to be paid; Taylor, Landlord Tenant, 265;
(Ed. of- 1879); Mack v. Patchin, 42 N. Y.
167; Trull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115. Cf.
Duffield v. Rosenzweig, 144 Pa. 520; Pittsburg, etc., R. R. v. Jones, 111 Pa. 204.
May Creelin then recover the $60 expended by him for pipes and droinage?
Did this expenditure enhance th. value of
the premises, by making them more conimodious, and healthy? We know not. It
may have been useless; or it may have added inappreciably to the value of the term.
It is the term of which the eviction deprived Creelin. Its value he may recover,
but nothing else. The money spent on
the premises is no measure of the value of
the lease thereof.

Can he recover the $150, the price obtained by Arnold for the good will and
fixtures? These had been sold to Creelin,
at the making of the lease and Arnold, apparently agreed to permit any responsible
party to whom Creelin might in turn sell
them, to succeed him as tenant of the
premises. The good will is, we think,
practically inseparable from the lease, an
incident which made the lease more valuable. We do not think its value as an
independent item can be recovered. In
estimating the value of the lease, in excess
of the rental, the effect on it of the annexation of the good will may be considered.
In no other way can compensation be allowed for its loss. Cf. Pittsburg, etc. R. R.
v. Jones lll Pa. 204. The fixtures are personal property. They were sold to Creelin
and thus became his. The subsequentsale
of them by Arnold, was a trespass. Creelin
is entitled to recover their value. The
motion for a non-suit is therefore overruled.
T. AL KNOX & CO. vs. JOHN JOHNSON,
et. al. TRADING AS JOHNSON MERCANTILE COMPANY, LIMITED.
Jointstock associations,act of June 2, 1874,
May 1, 1876, etc.-Decription of property contributed-Liability as general
partners.
GABRIEL H. MOYER and MERKEL LANDIS for the plaintiff.
1. When property has not been contributed, described, scheduled, and valued
as the act of May 1, 1876, directs, there is
no payment of the capital; and the members are liable as general partners.-Haslet
et. al.v. Kent et. al., 160 Pa. 85; Maloney
v. Bruce, 94 Pa. 249; Vanhorn v. Corcoran,
127 Pa. 255; Shetle v. Strong. 128 Pa. 315.
2. There must be a strict compliance
with the act.-Eliot v. Himrod, 108 Pa.
569; Hite N. Gas Co.'s Appeal, 118 Pa.
436; Hill v. Stetlei, 127 Pa. 145. A contribution of real estate, without any reference
whatever to an existing lien, is defective.Bank v. Creveling, Miles & Co., 177 Pa.
270.
RUEL U. CAPAVELL and ROBT. P.
STEWART for the defendant.

1. Only a substantial compliance with
the act is necessary.-Lander v. Logan,
12.3 Pa. 34: Laflin & Rand Co. v. Steytler,
146 Pa. 434; Rehfuss v. Moore, 134 Pa.
462; Cock v. Bailey, 146 Pa. 328.
2. The property contributed was accessible to creditors.-Stahle v. Spohn, 8 S. &
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R. 316; Bradley v. O'Donnell, 32 Pa. 279.
An interest in lands held under articles of
agreement, on which nothing has been
paid, is a valid contribution although
these facts have not been mentioned.Cock v. Bailey, supra.
On January 15, 1891, the "Johnson Mercantile Company, Limited" was dganized
under the act of June 2, 1874, P. L. 271; 2
P. & L. 3402, and its supplements. The
statement recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds gives the names of the
partners, and describes the character of the
business to be done. The capital contributed is thus described:
Frank Clark. ............................................

ThomasJones ..........................................

$8,000 cash.
S,000 cash.

John Johnson, Machines (naming
them), flour, feed,

etc ............
$2,000
land, (described
by meters and

bounds), ............. $5,600 $7,600 cash.
The land contributed by Johnson, he
held under an article of agreement, under
which the vendor engaged to convey it,
as soon as the purchase money should be
fully paid. The three partners estimated
the land as worth $6,800. They deducted
from this sum the unpaid purchase
money, $1,200, crediting Johnson with the
balance. In making the valuation, they
acted with fairness, and the land is now
worth $8,000. In June 1895, the association made an assignment for the benefit of
creditors. A dividend of 41 per cent. on
all claims was paid out of the proceeds of
the estate thus assigned. T. M. Knox &
Co. bring this action against the defendants as general partners, for the remaining
59 per cent. i. e. for $279.03.
In the organization of a partnership association it is necessary that a "statement"
be made, acknowledged, and recorded,
containing the full names of the partners,
"the amount of capital, of said associa
tion, subscribed for by each," the total
amount of capital and when and how to
be paid; the character of the business to be
conducted, and the location of the same,
the name of the association, with the word
limited added thereto, the contemplated
duration of the association, and the names
of the officers. An observance of these requirements is a precondition to the exemption of the members from the ordinary liability of partners. Vanhorn v.
Corcoran, 127 Pa. 255; Haslet v. Kent, 160

Pa. 85; Fearing v. Carroll, 151 Pa. 79;
Electric Co. v. Weber, 172 Pa. 635; First
National Bank of Danville v. Creveling,
177 Pa. 270.
Under the act of 1874, the contributions
of the partners had to be made in cash.
Its supplement, of May 1, 1876. P. L. 89;
2 P. & L. 3408, authorizes contributions in
"real or personal estate, mines or other
property, at a valuation to be approved by
all the members subscribing to the capital
of such association." Apparently any interest in land
can be contributed;
leaseholds; Cock v. Bailey, 146 Pa. 328;
equitable estates under contracts of purchase in fee; Cock v. Bailey, 146 Pa. 328;
legal estates, charged with liens, Ibid:
Laflin & Rand Co., v. Steytler, 146 Pa.
434. Personalty, of various forms may be
contributed, e. g.. machines, tools, implenients, Laflin & Rand Co. v. Steytler, 146
Pa. 434; possibly bills receivable and contracts under which moneys will be earned
by the association. Cf. Gearing v. Carroll,
151 Pa. 7-1; Maloney v. Bruce, 94 Pa. 249.
Whatever the property, however, it must
be so well described in the statement that
persons dealing with the association may
be able to identify it, and if they choose
estimate its value. Otherwise, the partners
will be personally liable for debts; Gearing
v. Carroll, 151 Pa. 79; Vanhorn v. Corcoran, 127 Pa. 2.55; Haslet v. Kent, 160 Pa.
85; First National Bank of Danville v.
Creveling, 177 Pa. 270.
As the object ot a description of the
thing is to enable creditors to appraise its
value, and determine, in view of all the
assets of the association, whether they can
safely give it credit, it is manifestly necessary not only to describe the thing, but to
disclose the nature of the interest in it,
which, the contributing partner possesses.
If a partner had an undivided one-third
in a farm, worth $24,000, a description of
the land with an appraisement of it at
$24,000, but without mention of the fractional estate of the partner would be misleading. The same would be true if thWe
partner held only a leasehold for 30 years,
or a life estate on the land. Nor is there
a material difference, if the partner owns
a tract of land subject to a mortgage, or
has an equitable interest in land under -a
contract of purchase, which lie cannot
ripen into a legal estate, without paying a
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sum of money, and which may be extinquished by the vendor, for default in paying the money. In First National Bank
of Danville v. Creveling, 177 Pa. 270, a
tract of land was bought by A, B and C
for $20,000, payable in quarterly instalments of $1,250, and secured by a mortgage. Only $1,250.of this money had been
paid, when the limited partnership was
formed. The statement described the
land, and put a valuation on it -excessive
apparently-of $75,000. It did not mention the mortgage; and the v.aluation was,
apparently, that of the land, and not of
the interest therein, of A, B and C. The
statement was adjudged bad because it did
not disclose the existence of the mortgage.
Of the good faith of Johnson and his copartners, in estimating the value of his
contribution, and describing it in the
statement, there need be no doubt. They
honestly estimated the land as worth
$6,800. They subtracted therefrom $1,200,
the unpaid purchase money. But, they
described the interest of Johnson in such a
way that creditors would understand it to
be an unencumbered fee simple. When
they inspected the land, and made a valuation of it, they could assume that he had
a full right thereon. They would put their
own appraisal upon it. They might consider it worth $5,000, or $5,600, or $6,000, or
$7,000. But, if they might be misinformed
as to what the interest of Johnson really
was, it is plain that this deception might
influence them in giving ,credit. Perhaps
it would have been enough, as in Cock v.
Bailey, 146 Pa. 328, to have said "subject
to such liens as may be against the same"
without indicating definitely what the
liens were. In the case just cited Paxson,
J., says "That some of it (i. e. the land)
was a mere equity of redemption could
have misled no one, as it was so described
in the articles." The creditors ofJohnson
& Co. had reason to suppose that the whole
value of the Johnson land, whatever it
was, was pledged for the payment of their
and others' debts. The statement misled
them. Johnson et. al. are therefore personally liable to the plaintiffs.
Judgment for the plaintiffs.

SARAH HESS vs. PASSENGER R R. CO.
Defendant's negligence must cause accident-Dogs areproperty.
FRANK T. MORROW and FRANK B.
JR., for plaintiff.
I. Slight doubt in favor of plaintiff is
sufficient to take case to jury.-Bucklin v.
Davidson, 155 Pa. 362; Fisher v. Monongahela R. R. Co., 131 Pa. 292.
II. (a) Violation city ordinance evidence
of negligence.-Pa. R. R. Co. v. James and
wife, 81 Pa. 194; Hanlon v. S, Boston R.
R. Co., 129 Mass. 310. (b) Negligence
question for jury.-Pa. R. R. Co. v. Long
and wife, 75 Pa 257; Pa. R. R. Co. v.
Lewis, 79 Pa. 33.
III. Plaintiff not negligent. Dogs at
large.-Goodman v. Gay, 15 Pa. 189.
IV. Trespass no defense to injury.State v. Rivers, 90 N. C. 738; Richardson
v. Carr, 1 Harr (Del) 142.
V. Dog is property.-Commonwealth
v. Depuy, 148 Pa. 201; Heisrodt v. Hackett, 34 Mich. 283.
RALPH H. LIGHT and GEORGE W.
('OLES cited the following cases to substantiate the respective points presented for
defendant.
l.-Moss et. al.v. Traction Co., 180 Pa.
389; Conner v. Traction Co., 173 Pa. 602;
Lane v. Atlantic Co., 111 Mass. 136; Lindernian v. Penna. R. R. Co., 165 Pa. 118;
Greiner v. P. R. R. Co., 175 Pa. 1; Conusky
v. Connellsville Street Ry. Co., 4 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 631.
2.-Rogers v. Lee, 140 Pa. 475; Marshall
v. R. R. Co., 132 Pa. 226; 30 Pittsb. Journal, p. 51; Gill v. R. R Co 59 Pa. 129.
.- Furniss v. Richards, bist. Rep. 1895,
p. 784.
4.-Glennin v. Wisson, 18 W. N. C. 7;
McIlvane v. Lantz, 4 Outerbridge, 586; P.
& R. R. R. Co. v. Schertle, 97 Pa. 450.
SELLERS,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Sarah Hess, on August 7, 1897, owned a
dog, for which 2 weeks before she had paid
$150, and for which she had been offered
$175 the day following her purchase of him.
The dog was playing and gamboling with
another dog, as the car of the defendant was approaching, leaped up and playfully ran across the tracks. While he was
between the tracks, he was struck by the
car, and its wheels ran over his body severing it. The car was running atthe rate of 14
miles per hour at the moment of the collision. The ordinance of the borough allowed 6 miles per hour only. The street
in which the accident occurred was much
frequented; foot passengers and vehicles
crossed it often, and there was also much
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longitudinal locomotion on it with horse
and vehicle.
Defendant asks the court to grant a nonsuit, (1) no negligence of defendant shown;
(2) the dog was a trespasser; (3) the
dog is not such property that damages for
its death can be recovered; (4), plaintiff
was negligent.
1. The only negligence of the defendant
suggested, is the alleged excessiveness of
the speed with which its car was running,
when it ran over the plaintiff's dog. The
car was then moving at the rate of 14
miles per hour. The street was much frequented. The borough ordinance forbade
a greater rate than six miles an hour. We
have so lately considered' the pertinency
of ordinances,-In questions of negligence,
that it is upeless now to spend time in
further discussion of it. The jury are
aware of the aptness of a speed of 14
miles per hour, to produce accidents, and
their determination that the maintenance
of such a velocity was negligent would not
be unreasonable.
But, the negligence of the defendant is
not actionable unless it caused the accident. The accident was the collision between the car and the dog. The dog was
not a passenger calculating his chances o
crossing the track, and foiled in the attempt to cross by the undue speed of the
car. He was gamboling in the roadway.
Whether, had the car been going at the
rate of six miles per hour, he would have
been struck, or if struck, killed, we see
nothing in the cause to indicate. How
then can the speed of the car be said to have
caused his death? It is not alleged that
the motorman was inattentive; that he did
not adopt due precautions to avoid the dog.
The dog, unexpectedly, as it appears, when
the car was very near him, leaped up and
ran across the track. His doing so was
not caused by the motion of the car.
Whether, doing so, he would nevertheless
not have been struck, i. e. would have got
over the track, had the car been running
with a reasonable swiftness, is purely a
matter of speculation.
2. We think it unnecessary to determine whether the dog was or was not a
trespasser.
3. The Act of May 15, 1889, P. & ]. 222,
Commonwealth v. Depuy, 148 Pa. 201,
and the 7th section of the Act of May 25,

1893, P. L. 136, enact that all dogs shall
be personal property, and shall be subjects
of larceny. At common law the dog was
not the subject of larceny. 4 BI. Com.
235; Findlay v. Bear, 8 S. & R. 571; Blair
v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136; but it did not
follow that he was not property, for whose
injury or eloignmenta civil remedy would
lie. Wright v. Ramscot, 1 Saund. 84;
Uhlein v. Cromack, 109 Mass. 273; 1 Am.
& Eng. Encyc. 347; 4 Bl. Com. 235; Heisrodt v. Hocker, 34 Mich. 283.- For this
particular dog, the plaintiff paid $150, and
she was offered for him $175. He was not
only property, but he had a considerable
percuniary value, more than has the ordinary horse. It hardly bears discussion
therefore that for depriving his owner of
him, by negligent killing, the party guilty
of the negligence would be answerable.
4. If the plaintiffs negligence in any way
contributed to the killing of her dog, she
could not recover his value of the defendant. But, her negligence, as well as that
of the defendant, must be proven. Does
the mere presence of the dog on the street
prove it? Leaving a horse without control, on the street, is presumptive negligence, Dickson v. McCoy, 39 N. Y. 400;
Gannon v. Wilson, 18 W. N. C. 7. The
horse is a large animal. He is not as intelligent, nor as intimate an associate and
friend of man, as the dog; nor is it the habit
of society to tolerate his running at large,
as they permit and tolerate the freedom of.
the dog. It cannot be said to be per se
negligence, for the plaintiff to have deliberately allowed her dog to be upon the
street. But, there is no evidence of such
deliberate permission.
For aught that
appears, the dog may have been on the
street-as, in several cases before the courts
of this state, very young children have
been on them-without fault on the part of
owner or parent. We are not prepared to
adopt the principle that the owner of a
dog must, absolutely, keep him out of the
street, or be remediless if he is killed wantonly or negligently by another.
For the first reason assigned, the plaintiff
must be non-suited.
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HARRY ELLIOTT vs. GEORGE
McALLISTER.
Vendor and Vendee- Trust in after acquired title-JudicialSale- Divestiture of
second mortgage.
M11otion for a
Soc. fa. sur mortgage.
new trial.
HARTMAN, JR., and CLAUDE
MVENCET
L. ROTH for the plaintiff.
1. John Jones purchased the five -acres
as trustee for Harry Elliott.-Clark v.
Martin, 49 Pa. 299; Brown v, McCormick,
6 Watts 60; Church v. Church, 25 Pa. 278;
Dentler's Appeal, 23 Pa. 505
2. McAllister took subject to the trust. Hays v. Hays, 179 Pa. 277; Locher's Appeal, 104 Pa. 609.
3. The second mortgage was not divested. -Good v. Sehoener, 10 Leg. Int.
561, 16 Phila. 656; Kennedy v. Borie, 166
Pa. 360; Saunders v. Gould, 124 Pa. 237;
Taylor v. Smith, 2 Whar. 432; Woodburn
v. Bank, 5 W. & S. 447.
D. EDWARD LONG and CLEON N. BERNTHEIZEL for the defendant.

When a sale is obtained under levari
facias, the vendee shall hold "clearly discharged and freed from all equity and
benefit of redemption and all other incumbrances.-Act of April 10, 1849,
Brightly's Purdon's Digest, p. 483.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

John Jones, owning a farm of 50 acres,
on which John Logue had a mortgage for
$2000, on MNarch 15, 1890, conveyed five
acres of it to James Hocket. He did not
cause the mortgage to be released as to the
part thus conveyed. On September 20th
of the same year Hocket gave a mortgage
for $200 upon the fiveacres to Harry Elliott.
On the Logue mortgage a sci. fa. issued
Feb. 15, 1894, to which Jones, Rocket and
Elliott were parties defendant. On the
judgment recovered, the 50 acre tract was
sold by the sheriff. Jones became the purchaser. On July 1, 1896, Jones again conveyed the five acre part to George McAllister. On Sept. 15, 1897, Elliott issued a
sci. fa. on his mortgage, making Hocket
and McAllister defendants. Judgment for
plaintiff. Defendant moves for a new trial.
If the sherifi's sale on the Logue mortgage divested the ownership of Rocket of
the five acres and the mortgage thereon to
Elliott, the scire facias cannot be maintained. On the other hand, if Rocket's
and Elliott's interests were not divested

by the sale on the Logue mortgage, there
is no effectual defence to it.
Ordinarily, a judicial sale on the earlier
of two liens divests all later liens, as well
as all interest derived from him who was
the owner of the land, when the lien was
created, subsequently to the creation of
such liens. A sale on the earlier of two
mortgages would divest the later. A sale
on a mortgage would divest the estate of
one who became a grantee subsequently to
the making of the mortgage, and any mortgage or other lien which such grantee
might impose on the premises. The sale
on the Logue mortgage therefore divested
the estate of Rockett, and the mortgage
given by him to Elliott, unless the special
facts prevented.
The sheriff's sale on the Logue mortgage
was to Jones. Jones was, at the time,
already the owner of 45 acres of the tract
then sold, and ho had recently been the
owner of the other five acres. As the case
before usinvolves the effect of the sale on
the five acres only, its effect on the other
45 will be pretermitted.
Had Rocket acquired the five acres
under and subject to the $2,000 mortgage, it
would have been his duty, as respects
Jones, to have paid at least that fraction of
the mortgage which would equal the
ratio of the value of the five acres to the
value of the 50 acres. But he did not buy
thus subject to the mortgage. Quod non
apparet, not est. We cannot presume
such a subjection of his purchase to the
mortgage, in the absence of evidence.
When he bought the five acres, equity
cast.on Jones, as the owner of the remaining 45 acres, and on the 45 acres, the burden of paying the whole mortgage. Re
might have paid the money to Logue,
without compelling him, or inducing him
(for we do not know whether Logue was
compelled or induced) to resort to a sheriff's sale. But Logue resorting to sheriff's
sale, the money paid by Jones, must
be considered as paid, so far as the five
acres are concerned, in the discharge of his
duty toward Hocket. As to the 45 acres,
lie had the option either to pay the $2,000
or to sacrifice his land. As to the five
acres, he had no option either to pay the
$2,000 or to allow Hocket's land to be sacrificed. He was, as to Rocket, under a
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duty to pay the money, if such payment became necessary, in order to save the land.
It does not appear whether the Logue
mortgage was created by Jones or by some
preceding owner of the land, nor, is it
material. His duty towards Hocket was
precisely the same as if he had himself
made the mortgage. He had, we must
presume, obtained the price for an unencumbered title, and his obligation to protect Hocket was absolute.
It is possible that had some stranger become the purchaser at the sheriff's sale,
the subsequent transfer of the laud to
Jones would not have revived the title of
Hocket, and the mortgage thereon, to
Elliott, lauch v. Dech, 116 Pa. 157; Rushton v. Lippincott, 119 Pa. 12. But, Cf.
Dentler's Appeal, 23 Pa. 505. The sale was
made directly to Jones. He thus practically pays the Logue mortgage, and his
estate in the 45 acres must be considered
as continuing precisely as it was before
the sale, except that it is freed from the
mortgage incumbrance; Kennedy v. Borie,
166 Pa. 3601 Woodburn v. Farmers' &
Mechanics' Bank, 5 W. & S. 447; Taylor
v. Smith, 2 Wh. 432; Good v. Schoener, 16
Phila. 656; Saunders v. Gould, 124 Pa. 237.
If he had placed any mortgages or liens

thereon, they would not be divested. Can
it make any difference whether he has
placed a mere lien thereon or whether he
has absolutely conveyed it? We think
not. His purchase of the 50 acres, was
as to the 5 acres previously sold to Hocket,
simply the means of discharging the
Logue mortgage in conformity with his
duty. The law will concede that he acquired a title as to the 5 acres, by the
sheriff's sale, only in order to make it ev
instantilapse by estoppel into his grantee,
Hocket.
Jones has conveyed to Mckllister the 5
acres. But McAllister has received them
subject to Jones' disabilities. The record
of the proceedings on the sci. fa. on the
Logue mortgage, shows that Hocket was
a terre-tenant. McAllister, as purchaser
of the estate acquired by Jones, at the
sheriff's sale on that mortgage, is affected
with notice of all that the record of the
action reveals. McAllister therefore holds
the five acres, precisely as Jones did, subject to an estoppel against the assertion of
his right, to the detriment of Elliott. Elliott has a right to have execution against
the premises. As no error was committed
in the trial, the rule for a new trial is discharged.

